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INTRODUCTION
1

The general prohibition against hearsay testimony serves as
2
one of our legal system’s most fundamental guarantees of truth.
The cardinal flaw of hearsay evidence lies in our inability to
3
assess the testimonial capacities of the declarant.
While
traditional courtroom mechanisms, such as the oath, the jury’s
perception of witness demeanor, and cross-examination test the
truth and accuracy of in-court statements, these safeguards are
∗
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1
Hearsay is defined as “a statement, other than the one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.” FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
2
See 5 J OHN H ENRY W IGMORE , E VIDENCE IN T RIALS AT THE C OMMON L AW §
1364, at 28 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1974) (praising the rule against
hearsay as “the most characteristic rule of the Anglo-American law of
evidence — a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury trial, the greatest
contribution of that eminently practical legal system to the world’s method
of procedure”); see also Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913)
(noting that hearsay’s exclusion rests in principles of common law).
3
This evidentiary concern explains why the definition of hearsay is
limited to statements offered for “the truth of the matter asserted.” F ED . R.
E VID . 801(c). If the probative value of the declaration is solely that it was
made and the listener heard it, rather than its actual truth, the declaration
falls beyond the scope of Rule 801’s definition. See, e.g., Howley v. Town of
Stratford, 217 F.3d 141, 155 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding declarant’s statements
not hearsay “since that testimony would be offered not to prove the truth of
his statements but only to prove that he made them”); United States v.
Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 586 (2d Cir.) (“Statements offered as evidence of
commands or threats or rules directed to the witness, rather than for the
truth of the matter asserted therein, are not hearsay.”), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
987 (1999).
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lacking for out-of-court statements. Of course, the exclusion of
hearsay testimony is far from absolute. The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the state counterparts recognize several
exceptions to the hearsay rule for circumstances where
overriding policy justifications warrant admission of an out-of5
court statement.
In these enumerated instances, some
enhanced reliability or special necessity outweighs the
testimonial concerns inherent to out-of-court statements.
This Article explores one of these hearsay exceptions,
namely Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)’s admission of
statements against the declarant’s interests, with a critical eye
on the rule’s underlying rationale. Simply put, Rule 804(b)(3)
rests on a behavioral approach to law that mirrors rational actor
6
theory. The Rule contemplates that if a reasonable person
makes a statement against interests, the statement is unlikely to
7
be a fabrication and thus retains substantial reliability. While
8
at first blush this rationale may appear logical, if not intuitive,
deeper reflection unearths serious psychological flaws.
In
particular, the literal rationale of the rule is unattainable.
Under a rational actor paradigm, persons do not consciously act
against their interests, but instead act to maximize their self9
interest. A rational actor who truly perceived a declaration to
be contrary to his interests would not have made the statement.
4

In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598 (1994), the Supreme
Court stated the following:
[T]he ways in which these dangers [of lying, misperception, faulty
memory, and confusion] are minimized for in-court statements — the
oath, the witness’ awareness of the gravity of the proceedings, the jury’s
ability to observe the witness’ demeanor, and, most importantly, the
right of the opponent to cross-examine — are generally absent for
things said out of court.
See also Donnelly, 228 U.S. at 273 (noting similar flaws in hearsay evidence).
5
The exceptions to the hearsay bar are articulated in Rule 803 and Rule
804. F ED . R. E VID . 803 (enumerating twenty-three exceptions where the
declarant’s availability is immaterial); F ED . R. E VID . 804(b) (listing five
exceptions where the declarant is unavailable). In addition, Rule 801(d)
identifies two types of out-of-court statements that do not qualify as hearsay.
F ED . R. E VID . 801(d) (listing prior statements by witnesses and admissions by
party-opponents as not hearsay).
6
See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Symposium: Passing Through the Door: Social Movement
Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 22-34 (2001) (overviewing
rational actor theory).
7
See infra P ART I.B.
8
The Supreme Court characterized Rule 804(b)(3)’s underlying
rationale as a “commonsense notion.” Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599.
9
Rubin, supra note 6, at 23.
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Rather, a rational actor makes a statement because, in his view,
at the instant of declaration it was in his interests to make it.
When a person acts otherwise, the rule’s reliability is wanting
10
because the individual fails to act reasonably.
Furthermore,
apart from this fundamental psychological flaw, enhanced
deficiencies relate to statements pertaining to penal interests.
Empirical research and common experience reveal myriad
reasons why persons make untrue, self-incriminating
11
statements.
Although these statements may be against the
declarant’s penal interests, they hardly are against the person’s
true personal interests. These deeper, personal interests are
what motivate a person to lie.
Yet, the effects Congress envisioned by enacting 804(b)(3)
are quite desirable. Through Rule 804(b)(3), Congress sought
to identify statements that are most likely to be true.
Notwithstanding the flaws in the current structure of the Rule, a
modest reformulation can achieve the guarantees of
trustworthiness that Congress envisioned, while remaining
faithful to rational actor theory. This Article proposes a twostep reformulation. First, Congress must alter the Rule’s inquiry
away from whether the statement is against the declarant’s
interests, as such a creature simply does not exist. A more
cogent query asks whether the statement, if untrue, would have
been against the declarant’s interests. Second, because of the
dubious trustworthiness of statements against a declarant’s
penal interests, Rule 804(b)(3) should return to its common law
roots and only admit statements relating to proprietary and
pecuniary interests.
This Article proceeds in three parts. I begin in Part I with
an overview of Rule 804(b)(3). I explain the history of the
exception, the modern formulation, and the underlying
reliability rationale that Congress used to justify a hearsay
exception. In Part II, however, I demonstrate fatal errors in
Congress’s conclusion that statements admitted under the
current structure of Rule 804(b)(3) carry greater indicia of
reliability. Not only can the true rationale of the rule never be
satisfied because reasonable persons do not consciously act

10

See infra PART II.A.
See infra PART III.B. But see also Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 (stating that “Rule
804(b)(3) is founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people, even
reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to make self-inculpatory
statements unless they believe them to be true”).
11
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against their interests, but also a statement tending to subject a
person to criminal liability is inherently suspect. Part III offers
a solution. By reformulating Rule 804(b)(3) to address a more
realistic conception of humans reasoning, many of the flaws
discussed in Part II can be eradicated. As specified in Part III,
this modification entails both restructuring the central inquiry
of the rule and eradicating any exception for statements
pertaining to the declarant’s penal interests.
I. OVERVIEW OF RULE 804(b)(3)
A. Historical Background of the Contemporary Standard
12

Enacted by Congress in 1975, Rule 804(b)(3) allows the
admission of statements against interests made by unavailable
13
nonparties. The threshold requirement of Rule 804(b)(3), as
14
with all Rule 804 exceptions, is the declarant’s unavailability.
An exhaustive enumeration of the circumstances that qualify for
15
unavailability is set forth in Rule 804(a). Once the declarant’s
12

Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1942 (1975); see Williamson, 512 U.S. at
612 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
13
A statement made by a party, which is offered by an adverse party, is
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2) as a statement by a party-opponent. F ED . R.
E VID . 801(d)(2). Rule 801(d)(2) presents a far more lenient standard for
admissibility than Rule 804(b)(3). For an out-of-court statement by an
adverse party to be admissible, Rule 801(d)(2) does not require the
unavailability of the declarant, and the statement does not need to be against
the declarant’s interests at the instant of declaration. Statements by party
opponents are excluded “on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is
the result of the adversary system, rather than the satisfaction of the
conditions of the hearsay rule.” F ED . R. E VID . 801 advisory committee’s note
(citing E DMUND M. M ORGAN , B ASIC P ROBLEMS OF E VIDENCE 265 (1962); John S.
Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule and Admissions, 85 U. P A . L.
R EV . 484, 564 (1937); 4 J OHN H ENRY W IGMORE , E VIDENCE IN T RIALS AT C OMMON
L AW § 1048 (James H. Chadbourn ed., 1972)).
14
See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Symposium: Analyzing “The Politics of [Evidence]
Rulemaking”, 53 HASTINGS L. J. 843, 884 n.82 (2002).
15
Unavailability includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant’s statement;
or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant’s statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant’s
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death
or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has
been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a
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unavailability is established, Rule 804(b)(3) admits statements
that satisfy the following requirements:
A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to
the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable
person in the declarant’s position would not have made the
statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to
expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate
the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
16
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

In sum, the Rule admits statements contrary to a person’s legal
interests, provided they are of the sort that a reasonable person
would not have made unless true.
The exception for statements against a declarant’s interests
has deep historical roots. Common law admitted statements
against the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interests but
refused to extend the exception to statements against penal
17
interests.
The most famous articulation of the common law
rule came in 1844 by the House of Lords in the seminal Sussex
18
Peerage Case.
The House of Lords limited the exception to
statements against the declarant’s proprietary or pecuniary
interests by holding that the defendant could not offer
supporting evidence that amounted to a criminal confession
19
made by an individual unavailable to testify.
For over 120
hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s
attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
FED. R. EVID. 804(a). In addition:
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim
of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or
wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of
preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
Id.
16
F ED . R. E VID . 804(b)(3).
17
F ED . R. E VID . 804 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b),
Exception (3), 1972 Proposed Rules (“The common law required that the
interest declared against be pecuniary or proprietary . . . .”); Emily F. Duck,
The Williamson Standard for the Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay for
Statements Against Penal Interest, 85 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 1084, 1085-86
(1995); Bernard S. Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 58 H ARV . L. R EV . 1, 29-52 (1944).
18
Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844); see 2 J OHN W.
S TRONG , M C C ORMICK ON E VIDENCE § 318, at 340 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter
M C C ORMICK ].
19
Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045; M C C ORMICK , supra note 18, § 318, at
340. At issue was whether Augstus D’Este was the legitimate son of the Duke
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years, until the enactment of Rule 804(b)(3), American courts
followed the Sussex Peerage holding and refused to expand the
20
exception to include statements against penal interests.
Rule 804(b)(3) remains faithful to the common law rule in
certain respects.
First, the Rule codifies common law by
allowing the admission of statements against pecuniary or
21
proprietary interests.
In addition, the modern rule tracks
common law by not admitting statements against social
22
interests.
The Supreme Court’s proposed rule originally
admitted statements that went against an individual’s social
interests, such as those that would make the declarant the
23
“object of hatred, ridicule or disgrace.”
Consistent with
common law, Congress deleted this provision, citing reliability
24
concerns.
Several scholars have criticized Congress’s
reasoning, arguing that social interests can provide just as
strong incentives for truthfulness as proprietary or pecuniary
25
interests.
of Sussex. D’Este attempted to prove his mother had been married to the
Duke by offering evidence of statements made by a deceased clergyman who
performed the marriage. The statement would have been against the
deceased clergyman’s criminal interests because he performed the marriage
in violation of The Royal Marriage Act. Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045.
20
See Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045; Peter W. Tague, Perils of the
Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and Unconstitutionality of Rule
804(b)(3)’s Penal Interest Exception, 69 G EO . L.J. 851, 859 (1981) (“American
courts heedlessly have followed the dictum in the Sussex Peerage.”); see also
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 273 (1913) (relying in part on the
Sussex Peerage Case to hold a statement inadmissible because it was against the
declarant’s penal interests only).
21
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3); see FED. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note to
Subdivision (b), Exception (3), 1972 Proposed Rules (The common law required
that the interest declared be pecuniary or proprietary . . . .”); Duck, supra note 17, at
1085-86; Jefferson, supra note 17, at 29-52; see also Sussex Peerage, 8 Eng. Rep. at 1045.
22
Glen Weissenberger, Federal Rule of Evidence 804: Admissible Hearsay from
an Unavailable Declarant, 55 U. C IN . L. R EV . 1079, 1115 (1987).
23
M C C ORMICK , supra note 18, § 319, at 343; Tague, supra note 20, at 866
(citing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence
for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.R.D. 161, 378 (1969)).
A handful of states have adopted provisions admitting statements against an
individual’s social interests. M C C ORMICK , supra note 18, § 319, at 343 (citing
cases in Oregon and Pennsylvania).
24
F ED . R. E VID . 804(b)(3) Note by Federal Judicial Center;
Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1115 n.160.
25
See, e.g., M C C ORMICK , supra note 18, § 318, at 340 (“Declarations against
social interest, such as acknowledgements of facts which would subject the
declarant to ridicule or disgrace, or facts calculated to arouse in the
declarant a sense of shame or remorse, seem adequately buttressed in
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Rule 804(b)(3), however, makes one significant departure
26
from common law. If a statement is of the sort that tends to
subject a person to criminal liability at the time of its
27
declaration, it may qualify as a hearsay exception.
In a
criminal trial, a statement against penal interests may either
inculpate or exculpate the defendant. If offered to exonerate
the accused, the statement is admissible as long as sufficient
28
indicia of reliability support its trustworthiness. The admission
of statements against penal interests had little support prior to
the enactment of Rule 804(b)(3). As articulated in Sussex
Peerage, common law refused to admit statements against penal
29
interests.
In addition, prior to Congress’s adoption of Rule
804(b)(3), the Supreme Court rejected the penal interests
exception in Donnelly v. United States, 30 holding that these
statements lack sufficient reliability to justify a hearsay
trustworthiness and should be received under the present principle.”);
Edward J. Imwinkelried, People v. Simpson: Perspectives on the Implications for
the Criminal Justice System: Declarations Against Social Interest: The (Still)
Embarrassingly Neglected Hearsay Exception, 69 S. C AL . L. R EV . 1427, 1451-57
(1996) (arguing that courts should employ the declaration against social
interests theory more often); Jefferson, supra note 17, at 39 (observing that a
person is unlikely “to concede the existence of facts which would make him
an object of social disapproval in the community unless the facts are true”).
26
J ON R. W ALTZ , T HE N EW F EDERAL R ULES OF E VIDENCE 134 (1973); David
Robinson, Jr., From Fat Tony and Matty the Horse to the Sad Case of A.T.:
Defensive and Offensive Use of Hearsay Evidence in Criminal Cases, 32 H OUS . L.
R EV . 895, 920 n.179 (1995); Michael M. Martin, The Supreme Court Rules on
Statements Against Interest, 11 T OURO L. R EV . 179, 181 (1994); Weissenberger,
supra note 22, at 1114.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissenting in Donnelly v. United States, asserted
the reliability of a criminal confession, stating “no other statement is so much against
interest as a confession of murder; it is far more calculated to convince than dying
declarations . . . .” 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing Mattox v.
United States, 146 U.S. 140 (1892)).
Some states have rejected similar expansion of their versions of Rule 804(b)(3)
to include statements tending to subject the declarant to criminal liability. See, e.g.,
Charles W. Gamble, Drafting, Adopting and Interpreting the New Alabama Rules of
Evidence: A Reporter’s Perspective, 47 ALA. L. REV. 1, 24 n.139 (1995) (citing ALA. R.
EVID. 804(b)(3); ALA. R. EVID. 804 advisory committee’s note) (discussing Alabama’s
refusal to adopt such an expansion).
27
F ED . R. E VID . 804(b)(3).
28
Id. (“A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.”); see,
e.g., Jennings v. Maynard, 946 F.2d 1502, 1506 (10th Cir. 1991) (discussing
indicia of reliability supporting the trustworthiness of a statement admitted
under Rule 803(b)(3)).
29
Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1045 (H.L. 1844).
30
228 U.S. 243 (1913).
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31

exception.
Perhaps the greatest challenge in applying Rule 804(b)(3)
is assessing whether a statement truly stands contrary to the
declarant’s interests. As the Advisory Committee Note to Rule
804(b)(3) instructs, this analysis “must be determined from the
32
circumstances of each case.” In addition, the text of the rule
requires the judge to consider the mindset of a reasonable
person in the declarant’s position at the time the statement was
33
made.
These requirements amount to an objective
determination of whether a reasonable person, aware of the
potential consequences of the statement, would have made the
34
statement.
Further debate surrounds the ambiguous scope of Rule
804(b)(3). In particular, should a statement in its entirety be
admitted, or should the statement be parsed so that only those
parts contrary to the declarant’s interests be admitted? The
35
plain text of Rule 804(b)(3) provides little guidance here.
Wigmore noted a related challenge when the statement against
36
interests refers to or incorporates the collateral statement.
The federal circuit courts of appeals split fairly evenly on the
37
admissibility of such collateral, non-inculpatory statements. In
31

Id.
F ED . R. E VID . 804 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b),
Exception (3); see United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388, 1405 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding that whether a hearsay statement bears sufficient indicia of
reliability depends on the particular circumstances under which the
statement was made), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1046 (1989).
33
F ED . R. E VID . 804(b)(3) (“[A] reasonable person in the declarant’s
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.”).
34
See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 299300 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding testimony inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3)
because the plaintiffs failed to show that the declarants were “conscious” that
the testimony was not in their best interests); see Jennings, 946 F.2d at1506
(concluding that the declarant must have understood that his statement to
an Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation agent could subject him to
criminal liability).
35
See, e.g., Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 612 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The text of the Rule does not tell us whether
collateral statements are admissible . . . .”); Michael D. Bergeisen, Note,
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) and Inculpatory Statements Against Penal
Interest, 66 C AL . L. R EV . 1189, 1202 (1978).
36
W IGMORE , supra note 2, § 1456, at 341.
37
For examples of decisions holding collateral, non-inculpatory remarks
admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), see United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244
(1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Garris, 616 F.2d 626 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 447
U.S. 926 (1980); and United States v. Casemento, 887 F.2d 1141 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990). For examples of decisions holding
32
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1994, the Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in Williamson
38
v. United States,
holding that the exception does not
39
incorporate collateral remarks.
Writing for the majority,
Justice O’Connor interpreted Rule 804(b)(3) as admitting “only
those declarations or remarks within the confession that are
40
individually self-inculpatory.” Therefore, Rule 804(b)(3) does
not allow admission of “non-self-inculpatory statements, even if
they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self41
inculpatory.”
B. Rationale Underlying Rule 804(b)(3)
Hearsay exceptions retain certain policy rationales that lie
42
either in necessity or reliability, or both. For example, excited
43
utterances are admissible because statements are presumed to
have enhanced reliability if the declarant lacks sufficient time to
44
devise a fabrication.
A similar presumption of greater
reliability underlies the exception for statements made for the

collateral, non-inculpatory remarks inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3), see
United States v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Porter,
881 F.2d 878 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989).
38
512 U.S. 594 (1994).
39
Id. at 598-602.
40
Id. at 599.
41
Id. at 600-01; see also United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir.)
(holding that “collateral statements, even ones neutral as to interests,” are
inadmissible despite their close proximity to the self-inculpatory statements),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 845 (1998).
42
Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1117 (“Like the other hearsay
exceptions contained in Rules 803 and 804, the exception for statement
against interest is predicated upon the dual grounds of necessity and
trustworthiness.”); see also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (citation
omitted) (holding that a hearsay statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate “indicia of reliability”).
43
F ED . R. E VID . 803(2).
44
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 (1990) (noting that excited
utterances are admissible because “such statements are given under
circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or
confabulation”); F ED . R. E VID . 803 advisory committee’s note (“The theory of
[the excited utterance exception] is simply that circumstances may produce a
condition of excitement which temporarily stills the capacity of reflection
and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication.”); Robert M. Hutchins
& Donald Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence, 28 C OLUM . L.
R EV . 432, 435 (1928) (“[U]nder certain external circumstances of physical
shock a state of nervous excitement may be produced which stills the
reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which
occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock.”).
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45

purpose of medical diagnosis on the theory that an individual
in need of medical care has strong motivations to be truthful
because of the natural desire to receive proper and accurate
46
medical treatment.
In enacting Rule 804(b)(3), Congress
concluded that statements against interests possess compelling
47
necessity and reliability justifications that warrant admission.
The necessity component rests in the unavailability prong
of the Rule 804 exceptions, which requires a compelling
justification for the declarant’s inability to provide the
testimony in court. Wigmore explained that the necessity
principle “signifies the impossibility of obtaining other evidence
48
from the same source . . . .” In these cases where “the witness
49
is practically unavailable, his statements should be received.”
Of course, not all statements of unavailable declarants are
admissible, so further indicia of reliability are needed.
The Advisory Committee explained that the reliability of
declarations against interests arises from the presumption that
“persons do not make statements which are damaging to
50
themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.”
Because of this enhanced reliability, statements against interests
are admitted under the theory that the traditional courtroom
safeguards of a judicial oath and cross-examination are
51
supplanted by the powerful human sanction of self-interests.
The reliability rationale has remained paramount to

45

F ED . R. E VID . 803(4).
F ED . R. E VID . 803 advisory committee’s note to paragraph (4).
47
F ED . R. E VID . 804 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b),
Exception (3) (discussing “[t]he circumstantial guaranty of reliability for
declarations against interest”); Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1117 (“[T]he
exception for statement against interest is predicated upon the dual grounds
of necessity and reliability.”).
48
W IGMORE , supra note 2, § 1456, at 326.
49
Id.
50
F ED . R. E VID . 804 advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b),
Exception (3) (citing Hileman v. Northwest Eng’g Co., 346 F.2d 668 (6th Cir.
1965)); accord United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1264 (7th Cir.) (“‘[t]he
circumstantial guarantee of reliability for declarations against interest is the
assumption that people do not make statements which are damaging to
themselves unless satisfied for good reason that they are true.’”) (quoting
F ED . R. E VID . 804 advisory committee’s note), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 894
(1991); Hileman v. Northwest Eng’g Co., 346 F.2d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 1965);
M C C ORMICK , supra note 18, § 317, at 335-36 (noting that the trustworthiness
safeguard is established “[u]nder the theory that people generally do not
lightly make statements that are damaging to their interests”).
51
Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1118.
46
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judicial interpretations of Rule 804(b)(3). This preoccupation
with reliability explains the Supreme Court’s narrow
construction of Rule 804(b)(3) in Williamson that safeguarded
against the risk of declarants combining incriminating
information and neutral or self-serving statements within the
52
same statement.
The Court reasoned, “Rule 804(b)(3) is
founded on the commonsense notion that reasonable people,
even reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not
to make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to
53
This reliability is unique to self-inculpatory
be true.”
statements because, as the Court explained in Williamson, “the
very fact that a statement is genuinely self-inculpatory . . . is
itself one of the ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’
54
that makes a statement admissible.” Even if a defendant makes
a generally self-inculpatory narrative, those parts of the
narrative which are not self-inculpatory possess no added
55
reliability. These reliability concerns intensify if the declarant
believes that a non-inculpatory remark would be admissible
provided it was intertwined with an inculpatory statement.
Courts also emphasize reliability concerns when
considering the admission of statements that are contrary to a
person’s legal interests in certain respects, but in furtherance of
his interests in other respects.
For example, courts are
reluctant to admit statements against pecuniary interests if it is
possible that the declarant foresaw that his statement could be
56
used to his benefit in a subsequent litigation.
If a statement
conceivably could go in both directions its reliability is severely
undercut. The reliability rationale also underscored Congress’s
52

Elissa J. Ferrante, Note, The Statements Against Penal Interest Exception to
the Hearsay Rule After Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999): Making the
Distinction Between Custodial and Non-Custodial Statements for Sixth Amendment
Analysis, 32 R UTGERS L.J. 519, 533 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court in
Williamson “required a higher level of reliability for [admission of]
statements under Rule 804(b)(3)”).
53
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994).
54
Id. at 605.
55
Id. The approach taken in Williamson mirrors that of the California
Supreme Court in People v. Leach, 541 P.2d 296 (1975). In Leach, the court
held that only the portions of a statement specifically against the declarant’s
interests are admissible. Id. at 311 (interpreting C AL . E VID . C ODE § 1230
(West 1966)).
56
See Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co., Inc., 922 F.2d 272, 282-83 (5th Cir.
1991) (holding that the plaintiff-declarant most likely realized that his
statements to an insurance adjuster would be used in forthcoming litigation,
thereby creating a motive to fabricate).
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refusal to extend the rule to statements against social interests.
Despite the Supreme Court’s inclusion of such statements in its
proposed rule, the House Judiciary Committee deleted the
provision reasoning that these statements “lack[] sufficient
57
guarantees of reliability.”
This diminished reliability stems
from the concern that because of society’s constantly changing
moral norms, courts cannot objectively discern whether a
particular declarant perceived the statement to be contrary to
58
his interests.
II. DEFICIENCIES IN RULE 804(b)(3)’S RELIABILITY RATIONALE
Perhaps Rule 804(b)(3)’s seemingly intuitive premise has
shielded it from the scrutiny it needs. In particular, two fatal flaws
reside in the current text of Rule 804(b)(3). First, is it even possible
for a reasonable person to make a statement against his interests? A
person acting consciously and reasonably behaves in line with his
interests, thereby defeating the reliability guarantee of the rule.
Second, does the reliability guarantee carry any force with statements
against penal interests? Although criminal punishments may appear
more severe to an outside observer, a person’s motivations for
fabricating self-inculpatory statements are appreciably stronger and
more common in the criminal context than in the civil context.
A. Reasonable Persons Do Not Act Consciously Against Their Interests
The basic theory for the reliability of statements against
interests is relatively straightforward. A person is unlikely to
make a statement against his own interests unless that statement
59
is true.
At first blush, this intuition may appear
60
commonsensical.
Further reflection, however, forces us to
reconsider the Rule’s wisdom, particularly in light of the Rule’s
consciousness and reasonableness requirements.
Rule 804(b)(3) imposes four requirements relevant to this
57

H OUSE J UDICIARY C OMMITTEE , F EDERAL R ULES OF E VIDENCE , H.R. Rep. No.
93-650, at 16 (1973) (citing United States v. Dovico, 380 F.2d 325, 327 nn.2, 4
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 944 (1967)).
58
Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1115 (“Where only ‘social’ interests
are concerned, the requisite guarantees of trustworthiness are not thought
sufficiently high to outweigh the danger that, in a world of rapidly changing
moral attitudes, the statement may not have been against the declarant’s
interest as he or she perceived it.”).
59
See supra P ART I.B.
60
See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 599 (referring to Rule 804(b)(3)’s rationale
as a “commonsense notion”).
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criticism. First is the Rule’s objective reasonableness standard.
The text of Rule 804(b)(3) leaves no doubt that the
determination of whether a statement is against interests must
be made objectively from the perspective of a rational actor.
The Rule instructs that a statement is admissible if “a reasonable
person in the declarant’s position would not have made the
61
statement unless believing it to be true.”
As the language
compels, courts have interpreted this standard from the
objective perspective of a reasonable person in the declarant’s
62
position, not necessarily the declarant himself.
Second, the declarant must have understood the statement
to be against his interests. Without this consciousness prong,
the declarant would lack adequate basis for making a reasonable
determination, thus eradicating the statement’s reliability.
Because of the declarant’s unavailability, conclusive proof of
63
actual awareness is often impossible.
Therefore, courts have
looked at the surrounding circumstances to determine whether
a reasonable declarant knew and understood the ramifications
64
of the statement. The traditional approach has required
apparent awareness by the declarant that the statement was
65
contrary to his interests.
Some courts have even required
proof that the declarant was subjectively aware of the danger to
66
his interests.
The third requirement is closely related to the second, but
merits elaboration. Rule 804(b)(3) imposes a temporal analysis
made from the instant of the declaration. The Rule explicitly
provides that it addresses statements that are contrary to the
67
declarant’s interests at the time they are made. The Rule does

61

F ED . R. E VID . 804(b)(3) (“[A] reasonable person in the declarant’s
position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true.”).
62
See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 232 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983); United States v. Satterfield, 572 F.2d 687,
691 n.1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 840 (1978).
63
See, e.g., W IGMORE , supra note 2, § 1456, at 321.
64
Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1120.
65
Id.
66
See, e.g., In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 299300 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding testimony inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3)
because the plaintiffs failed to show that the declarants were “conscious” that
the testimony was not in their best interests); see also Jennings v. Maynard,
946 F.2d 1502, 1506 (10th Cir. 1991) (concluding that the declarant must
have understood that his statement to an Oklahoma State Bureau of
Investigation agent could subject him to criminal liability).
67
F ED . R. E VID . 804(b)(3).

14

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:001

not allow for ex post consideration of the effects of the
statement. What matters is whether the declarant perceived the
statement as against his interests at the time of the declaration,
not at some latter point.
Rule 804(b)(3)’s final requirement pertains to its scope.
The exception does not apply to all interests, but only to legal
ones. Statements may be admissible only if they are “contrary to
the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or . . . tended
68
to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability.”
Therefore, a statement against a person’s general interests,
regardless of the strength of those interests, is not admissible
unless it carries legal ramifications.
In sum, Rule 804(b)(3)’s four requirements look at
whether a reasonable person, aware of the consequences, would
make a statement. This analysis boils down to a rational actor
69
paradigm.
Like Rule 804(b)(3), rational actor theory
considers the action of a reasonable person, acting consciously
70
and fully aware of the consequences of acting. Proponents of
rational actor theory maintain that “actors strive to maximize
71
their material self-interest.” The Rule presumes that if such an
actor consciously makes a statement against his legal interests,
and at the instant of the declaration comprehends the
consequences of that statement, the statement is likely to be
72
true. Besides never being subjected to empirical scrutiny, this
proposition fails to withstand common sense scrutiny.
Rule 804(b)(3) suffers from a fundamental psychological
flaw. Rational actors do not consciously act against their
73
personal interests.
Rather, the most basic articulation of
rational actor theory instructs that actors are motivated only by
68

Id.
In this Article, I do not endorse rational actor theory as flawless. See
Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 S TAN . L.
R EV . 1471, 1473 (1998) (“Objections to the rational actor model in law and
economics are almost as old as the field itself.”). Rather, my argument is that
as long as Congress adopts a rational actor paradigm for Rule 804(b)(3), it is
essential that the rule remain faithful to rational actor theory.
70
See Wiliam S. Blatt, Interpretive Communities: The Missing Element in Statutory
Interpretation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 629, 637 (2001) (discussing rational actor model).
71
Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place: Economics and
Phenomenology, 51 V AND . L. R EV . 1705, 1715 (1998).
72
Welsh S. White, Accomplices’ Confessions and the Confrontation Clause, 4
W M . & M ARY B ILL R TS . J. 753, 763 (1996).
73
Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. R EV .
543, 638 (2000)
69
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74

self-interest.
Rational actors possess “a ranked set of
preferences that function according to basic logical
75
principles.”
Rational actors, in turn, act in congruence with
these preferences, allowing for the prediction of behavior based
76
on the actor’s expected utility. Gary Becker explained that “all
human behavior can be viewed as involving participants who [1]
maximize their utility [2] from a stable set of preferences and
[3] accumulate an optimal amount of information and other
77
inputs in a variety of markets.”
Although humans have
bounded rationality, stemming from limited computational
skills and seriously flawed memory, rational actors nonetheless
78
strive to follow their set of preferences to maximize utility.
Therefore, if a person voluntarily acts in a manner that fails to
reflect these preferences, and is aware that he is acting
inconsistently with these preferences but chooses to act that way
nonetheless, the person ceases to function as a rational actor.
Yet, this is precisely the sort of irrational behavior that Rule
804(3) contemplates in admitting statements against interests.
Furthermore, in weighing Rule 804(b)(3)’s reliability,
Congress conflated personal interests with legal interests. To
paraphrase the rule’s well-accepted rationale, a person does not
make a statement harmful to himself unless that statement is
79
likely to be true. Even if this rationale were to hold water, the
purported reliability would rest on an individual’s personal
interests, the strongest interests a person possesses. These are
the interests that affect a rational actor’s decisionmaking
process. Any influence to state a falsehood would arise from an
individual’s personal interests in not telling the truth. The
rationale of Rule 804(b)(3) thus requires an identity of personal
and legal interests.
Common experience, however, tells us that this assumption of
74

Id.
Tanina Rostain, Educating Homo Economicus: Cautionary Notes on the New
Behavioral Law and Economics Movement, 34 L AW & S OC ’ Y R EV . 973, 976-77
(2000); see also Geoffrey Rapp, The Economics of Shootouts: Does the Passage of
Capital Punishment Laws Protect or Endanger Police Officers, 65 A LB . L. R EV . 1051,
1056 (2002) (arguing that a “rational actor” model may be appropriate in the
context of violence against police officers because such violence may be less
likely to result from emotional impulses).
76
Rostain, supra note 75, at 977.
77
G ARY S. B ECKER , T HE E CONOMIC A PPROACH TO H UMAN B EHAVIOR 14
(1976).
78
Jolls et al., supra note 69, at 1479.
79
See supra P ART I.B.
75
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the identity of personal and legal interests is highly flawed. Acting
against personal interests is undesirable for the actor per se, whereas
acting against legal interests may or may not be undesirable. A
statement can be contrary to a person’s legal interests, however, in
the person’s view it is nevertheless in his personal interest to make
the statement. A person’s personal and legal interests most notably
fall out of line when a reasonable person makes a statement against
his penal interests. When a reasonable person makes a conscious
decision to make a statement against his penal interests, that person
has concluded that some other interest overrides his penal interests.
Perhaps the declarant is hoping to exculpate a friend or loved one.
Or the declarant may be willing to incur civil liability to advance some
other interest. When personal and legal interests fall out of line, the
reliability rationale of the rule collapses, rendering no greater
reliability to this type of hearsay than to any other.
Intuition also supports this criticism. When reasonable
persons consciously act, they determine at that point in time
that the act is in their interests, regardless of the presence of
resultant effects that an outside observer might perceive as
deleterious or undesirable. Such action in accordance with self80
interests is the definition of a rational act.
Any person who
acts otherwise is not behaving rationally. The result may be
behavior that seems bizarre and irrational to an outside
observer, but nonetheless is highly rational for the actor.
Criminals voluntarily confess because they believe it is in their
interests to do so. For some reason, perhaps a desire to expiate
his guilt, to gain notoriety, or to strike a deal with the
authorities, the suspect deems it in his personal interests to
confess. Therefore, although the confession is contrary to the
criminal’s penal interests, the confession is still consistent with
the criminal’s personal interests.
Furthermore, the plain text of the rule overlooks a critical
element of rational actor theory. An important part of the
81
utility function of most people is bounded self-interest. People
often care, and more importantly act as if they care, about
82
For instance, a wife who
others in certain circumstances.
makes a self-incriminating statement to protect her husband
from criminal prosecution acts in accord with her interests. She
is fully aware of her action and decides, at that moment in time,
80
81
82

Freeman, supra note 73, at 638; Rostain, supra note 75, at 976-77.
Jolls et al., supra note 69, at 1479.
Id.
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that her optimal scenario is to save her husband from criminal
prosecution. Therefore, the strongest interests influencing the
83
wife are concerns for the situation of another person.
Equally compelling arguments apply to statements subjecting a
person to pecuniary or proprietary liability.
Although these
statements may be financially harmful, they are not against the
person’s interests if made freely and consciously. The requirements
of the rule again defeat the reliability rationale. If these statements
were perceived by the declarant to be against his interests at the time
of the declaration, and the declarant behaved as a rational actor, the
declarant would never make the statement. Rather, there must be
some other personal interests to explain the statement. Therefore,
statements against pecuniary or proprietary interests can be just as
calculated and susceptible to fabrication as any other hearsay
statement.
Even if a person acts in a manner that he later deems to be
against his interests, the person still considered the behavior in
line with his interests at the point of action. For instance, a
criminal who chooses to commit a crime made a conscious
decision that criminal activity is in his best interests at that
point in time. If at a subsequent time, the criminal is arrested,
he likely will determine that the criminal act was not in his
personal interests.
This does not change the criminal’s
perception at the instant of acting that committing the crime
was the right choice. In addition, many smokers who develop
lung cancer may realize that smoking was not in their interests.
This future realization does not change the fact that, at the
instant of deciding to start to smoke, these individuals
considered smoking consistent with their interests. Similarly, if
the wife in the above example later regrets making the selfincriminating statement, that does not change the fact that she
initially viewed the statement as consistent with her interests.
Both Rule 804(b)(3) and rational actor theory evaluate the
decisionmaking that occurs at this first moment in time, not the
84
second.

83

Cf. United States v. White, 240 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2001) (affirming
sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice for a defendant who
convinced his girlfriend to tell the police that she owned drugs that were
actually his).
84
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.

18

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 33:001

B. Dubious Reliability of Statements Against Penal Interests
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes praised the reliability of
statements against penal interests, commenting that “no other
statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder .
85
. . .”
This reliability guarantee is the most fundamental
justification for admitting statements under Rule 804(b)(3).
Congress made clear that reliability must be the focus of the
rule when it deleted language concerning statements contrary
86
to social interests.
Courts have consistently kept reliability
87
concerns paramount in interpreting Rule 804(b)(3), with the
most notable example being the Supreme Court’s reasoning for
refusing to extend the scope of the rule to collateral, non88
inculpatory statements in Williamson.
The reliability of statements against penal interests that
Justice Holmes lauded may make sense at first glance. Persons
generally do not want to find themselves in prison, so it would
seem logical that penal interests carry notable strength. Upon
further reflection, however, this logic falls apart. As Professor
Glen Weissenberger observed, while the rationale of Rule
804(b)(3) may have superficial appeal, “common experience
also teaches that individuals will fabricate or tell half-truths
despite the personal consequences in order to protect friends or
89
family members or to incriminate enemies.”
Both a basic
consideration of motives for lying and significant empirical
research reveal extremely compelling reasons to fabricate selfinculpatory statements in criminal trials.
Several potential flaws reside in self-inculpatory statements.
First, the declarant may have ulterior motives to deceive the
authorities. Indeed, courts have been skeptical of inculpatory
statements against penal interests because the declarant may be
motivated to make false statements to curry favor with the
90
authorities, or to shift or share blame for a crime.
This
concern becomes intensified for statements made in the course
of a plea-bargaining. During plea negotiations, persons have

85

Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 278 (1913) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
86
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
87
See supra note 56.
88
See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
89
Weissenberger, supra note 22, at 1118.
90
Andrew R. Keller, Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and
the Confrontation Clause, 83 C OLUM . L. R EV . 159, 163-64 (1983).
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patent motivations to curry favor with the police and to lie.
Accordingly, courts have subjected statements made in the
91
course of plea-bargaining to close scrutiny.
The Advisory
Committee appeared concerned with this flaw when it cautioned
against allowing statements made to a grand jury to fall within
92
the scope of Rule 804(b)(3). The Committee argued that the
statements may not truly be against interests, but rather may be
93
an attempt to gain favor with the authorities. The note to Rule
804(b)(3) warns that a “statement admitting guilt and
implicating another person, made while in custody, may well be
motivated by a desire to curry favor with the authorities and
94
hence fail to qualify as against interest.”
The declarant may also possess a desire to deceive
authorities in order to inculpate another individual. The Fifth
95
Circuit, in United States v. Sarmiento-Perez, noted that “the
enmity often generated in a conspiracy gone awry” could
96
provide clear motive to falsify accusatory statements.
While
bizarre, it is certainly within reason to envision situations where
intense enmity and hatred would induce someone to take such
97
extreme action.
In the eyes of many, the greatest concern as to the validity
of a statement against penal interests stems from aggressive and
98
coercive police interrogation techniques. These methods can
91

See R ICHARD O. L EMPERT & S TEPHEN A. S ALTZBURG , A M ODERN A PPROACH
E VIDENCE 491 (2d ed. 1982) (noting that because “statements to law
enforcement officials may be part of a plea bargaining process or may be
otherwise motivated by a desire to curry favor . . . . [S]uch statements are
subject to close scrutiny”).
92
F ED . R. E VID . 804(b)(3) advisory committee’s note to Subdivision (b),
Exception (3).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 834 (1982).
96
Id. at 1102.
97
See Keller, supra note 90, at 164 (“Other motives to falsify may be
present even when there is no fear of reprisal for admitting a crime: the
desire to share blame with another; the wish for revenge; the hope of
diverting attention from oneself; and even publicity—seeking or simply
lying.”).
98
The crisis of coerced false confessions arising from improper
interrogation techniques has received extensive scholarly attention. See, e.g.,
G ISLI H. G UDJONSSON , T HE P SYCHOLOGY OF I NTERROGATIONS , C ONFESSIONS AND
T ESTIMONY (1992); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of
False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 429 (1998)
[hereinafter Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions]; Albert W.
TO
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elicit emotional shock, which in turn distorts a person’s memory
99
during the interrogation.
Although especially high for
100
suggestible criminal suspects,
this danger is equally
conceivable for potential witnesses in criminal trials. Police
interrogation methods can endeavor to dupe an individual into
submitting a harmful statement with the ultimate intention of
using that statement against another individual. Even though
such psychologically-induced false confessions appear to be
occurring with troubling frequency, police and criminal justice
101
professionals seem to be doing little to stop them.
A related problem involves false confessions that do not
arise from police pressure, the so-called “voluntary false
102
confessions.”
The bizarre psychology explaining these
confessions causes great concern with the reliability of Rule
804(b)(3). Individuals who voluntarily provide false confessions
often go to the police station and inform the authorities that
103
they committed the crime.
Lawrence Wrightsman and Saul

Alschuler, Constraint and Confession, 74 D ENV . U. L. R EV . 957 (1997); Gail
Johnson, False Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic
Recording of Custodial Interrogations, 6 B.U. P UB . I NT . L.J. 719 (1997); Richard
J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision To Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and
Irrational Actor, 74 D ENV . U. L. R EV . 979 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, The
Decision To Confess Falsely]; Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the
Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy Confessions, 17 H ARV . C.R.-C.L. L.
R EV . 105 (1997); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 S TAN . L. R EV . 21 (1987). For thorough
discussions of police interrogation techniques, see G UDJONSSON , supra, at 2449, and Ofshe & Leo, The Decision To Confess Falsely, supra, at 985-1050.
99
G UDJONSSON , supra note 98, at 224 (citing H UGO M UNSTERBERG , O N THE
W ITNESS S TAND : E SSAYS ON P SYCHOLOGY AND C RIME (1908)).
100
One of the most well-known examples of police convincing an
impressionable suspect that he committed a crime involved Peter Reilly, who
falsely confessed to killing his mother after a grueling interrogation. Two
years after Reilly’s conviction of first-degree manslaughter, the judge granted
Reilly a new trial and the prosecutor declined objection to the defense’s
motion to dismiss the manslaughter charge. See, e.g., D ONALD S. C ONNERY ,
G UILTY U NTIL P ROVEN I NNOCENT 53-79 (1977) (describing police
interrogation techniques that resulted in Peter Reilly’s confession); Johnson,
supra note 98, at 722-23; White, supra note 98, at 125-28 (using Peter Reilly as
an example of a suggestible suspect); David Howard, New Mission: Recording
Police Interrogations, N.Y. T IMES , May 25, 1997, at 1 (describing Peter Reilly’s
story).
101
Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 88 J. C RIM . L. &
C RIMINOLOGY 621, 689-90 (1996) (citations omitted).
102
Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of Alleged Cases of
Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 603 n.423
(1999).
103
Id. at 691 n.290.
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Kassin cite three explanations for voluntary false confessions.
The first cause, and most important one, is a deranged desire
for the publicity and attention that the false confession will
104
attract.
The individual has a pathological need to become
105
infamous, even if the consequences mean imprisonment.
The
danger is particularly real for high-profile crimes. The more
well-known the offense, the more likely false confessors will
106
emerge.
For example, over 200 people “confessed” to the
107
Lindbergh kidnapping.
Second, Wrightsman and Kassin
argue that the individual may wish to expiate guilt for a previous
108
This individual may feel the need to subject
wrongful act.
himself to punishment and use a false confession as the means
to that end. Wrightsman and Kassin’s third reason is that the
109
person may be unable to distinguish between fact and fantasy.
A person acting under this motivation is delusional and may
have hallucinated or dreamt that he committed the crime.
Doctor Gisli Gudjonsson adds a fourth possible
explanation, which bears particular relevance to Rule
804(b)(3). Gudjonsson argues that “people may volunteer a
false confession . . . in order to assist or protect the real
110
culprit.”
While Gudjonsson believes this reason is most
common in minor cases, he also believes it can occur in major
111
criminal cases, such as homicide.
If Gudjonsson is correct
and the reasoning he describes occurs with any discernible
frequency, the trustworthiness of a statement against penal
interests is all but eliminated. An example of this is the case of
George Parker, who claimed he confessed to aggravated
104

L AWRENCE W RIGHTSMAN & S AUL K ASSIN , C ONFESSIONS IN THE C OURTROOM
76 (1993).
105
G UDJONSSON , supra note 98, at 226.
106
Leo, supra note 101, at 691 n.290.
107
G UDJONSSON , supra note 98, at 226; Leo, supra note 101, at 691 n.290
(citing Miles Corwin, False Confessions Not Good for Investigator’s Souls, D ENVER
P OST , May 4, 1996, at 22A).
108
W RIGHTSMAN & K ASSIN , supra note 104, at 77.
109
Id.
110
G UDJONSSON , supra note 98, at 226.
111
Id. Gudjonsson cites evidence that confessing to a crime in order to
protect somebody else, such as a friend, is particularly common in juvenile
cases. Id. One study of a specialized forensic unit for juveniles found that
23% claimed to have made a false confession to the police in order to protect
a friend or a relative from possible prosecution.
Id. (citing Graeme
Richardson, A Study of Interrogative Suggestibility in an Adolescent Forensic
Popular 87 (unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Univ. of Newcastle Upon Tyne)(on file
with author)).
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manslaughter because he was in love with the woman who
112
actually committed the crime.
For an individual like George
Parker, his “confession” was not truly against his interests
because his strongest interest was to protect his girlfriend.
Professor Paul Cassell agrees with Gudjonsson that a desire
113
to protect others often results in false confessions.
In fact,
Cassell suggests that a motivation to protect others leads to even
more
false
confessions
than
coercive
interrogation
114
techniques.
According to Cassell, “[c]ommon sense suggests
that suspects will more often ‘confess’ for understandable
reasons (such as protecting a loved one) than because police
have somehow convinced them they actually committed a
115
crime.”
As support, Cassell cites Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson’s
study of false confessions among Icelandic prisoners, which
revealed that “48% [of false confessions] stemmed from
‘protecting a significant other,’ such as a peer, a friend, or a
116
relative.”
In addition, Cassell suggests that this figure may be
greater in the United States given the “Icelandic ‘inquisitorial
117
Furthermore, the Gudjonsson and Sigurdsson
legal system.’”
figure covers wrongful confession. Cassell estimates that because
suspects are more likely to redact police-induced false
confessions than voluntary false confessions, the proportion of
118
police-induced confessions is likely to be approximately 38%.
This concern surrounding false, self-inculpatory statements
is intensified by the declarant’s ability to assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege after making the initial statement. Courts
have held that invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination
satisfies
Rule
804’s
unavailability
119
requirement.
After offering the self-inculpatory statement,
112

See Bedau & Radelet, supra note 98, at 150-51 (citing State v. Parker, 93
N.J. 260, 460 A.2d 665 (1983) (describing the case of George Parker)).
113
Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent From False Confessions and Lost
Confessions—and From Miranda, 88 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 497 (1998).
114
Id. at 519.
115
Id.
116
Id. (citing Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon Sigurdsson, How Frequently Do False
Confessions Occur?: An Empirical Study Among Prison Inmates, 1 P SYCHOL . C RIME
& L. 21, 23 (1994)).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
See, e.g., United States v. Sasso, 59 F.3d 341, 349 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The
declarant’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination constitutes unavailability.”); United States v. Matthews, 20 F.3d
538, 545 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the unavailability condition was met
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the declarant can refuse to make the statement again and can
even refuse to acknowledge that the initial declaration was ever
made. As a result, the consequences of making the selfinculpatory statement are minimized.
These reliability concerns led to the corroborating evidence
requirement for admission of self-inculpatory statements that
serve to exculpate a defendant, suggesting an implicit
acknowledgement by Congress that these statements retain
inherently dubious reliability. The House Judiciary Committee
recognized that statements “tending to exculpate the accused
are more suspect and . . . should have their admissibility
conditioned
upon
some
further
provision
insuring
120
trustworthiness.”
As a result, if a court determines a
statement to be contrary to the declarant’s criminal interests
and would serve to exonerate the defendant, the court must
consider whether corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
121
the trustworthiness of the statement.
Although the
determination of whether corroborating evidence exists lies
122
the court should
within the discretion of the trial court,
consider several factors, including (1) the time and the party to
whom the statement was made, (2) the existence of
corroborating circumstances in the case, (3) “the extent to
which the declaration is” truly against the declarant’s interests,
123
and (4) “the availability of the declarant as a witness.”
Some
courts have interpreted the corroborating evidence requirement
because the declarant was a codefendant who elected not to testify); F ED . R.
E VID . 804(a)(1) (defining unavailability to include assertion of a privilege).
If granted immunity, however, the witness no longer satisfies the
unavailability requirement of Rule 804. Weissenberger, supra note 22, at
1083.
120
F ED . R. E VID . 804 House Judiciary Committee Report.
121
United States v. Thomas, 571 F.2d 285, 290 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding
corroborating circumstances clearly indicating trustworthiness because the
defendant was only marginally involved in the crime, as opposed to the
declarant who was the mastermind, and because the chance of fabrication
was slight because the statement was spontaneous); United States v. Oropeza,
564 F.2d 316, 325 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding insufficient corroborating
evidence to indicate trustworthiness because the declaration was not
spontaneous, the declaration was given to its proponent at trial, and the
declaration was not truly inculpatory of the declarant), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1080 (1978).
122
United States v. Vega, 221 F.3d 789, 803-04 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1155 (2001); United States v. Hoyos, 573 F.2d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir.
1978); United States v. Guillette, 547 F.2d 743, 754 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 839 (1977).
123
Oropeza, 564 F.2d at 325; Guillette, 547 F.2d at 754.
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as erecting a significant bar. The First Circuit has instructed
that minimal corroboration is insufficient because “Congress
meant to preclude reception of exculpatory statements against
penal interests unless accompanied by circumstances solidly
124
indicating the trustworthiness.”
At the very least, the
corroboration
requirement
demonstrates
judicial
acknowledgement that a statement against penal interests is
suspect.
III. PROPOSED REFORMULATION OF RULE 804(b)(3)
These deficiencies force us to reconsider the wisdom
behind Rule 804(b)(3), and ponder an approach that more
effectively guarantees reliability. This reformulation would
entail two prongs, both of which individually address the
125
shortcomings identified earlier.
First, the language of the
rule must better comport with human reasoning. Reasonable
people do not consciously act against their interests. As an
alternative, an inquiry into whether the statement, if false,
would be against the person’s interests contains stronger indicia
of reliability because it is consistent with rational actor theory.
The second modification is simple: return to the common law
rule by eradicating any hearsay exception for statements
pertaining to penal interests.
Both empirical studies and
common experience indicate that the reliability rationale is
126
weakened tremendously for statements against penal interests.
A. Restructuring the Focus of Rule 804(b)(3)’s Inquiry
The underlying goal of Rule 804(b)(3) is praiseworthy.
Our justice system should create rules of evidence that enable
the admission of statements that are unlikely to be false.
Unfortunately, the current language does not achieve this end.
As discussed earlier, reasonable persons act in their own
127
interests.
Someone who consciously and truly acts contrary to
his interests is no longer acting reasonably. Therefore, when a

124

United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir. 1976) (“[T]here is
no question but that Congress meant to preclude reception of exculpatory
hearsay statements against penal interest unless accompanied by
circumstances solidly indicating trustworthiness. This requirement goes
beyond minimal corroboration.”).
125
See supra P ART II.
126
See supra P ART II.B.
127
See supra P ART II.A.
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reasonable person consciously makes a declaration contrary to
his legal interests, that person is acting in accordance with some
stronger, personal interests.
It is possible to minimize, if not eliminate, this flaw. A
more sensible inquiry queries whether a statement, if false,
would go against the individual’s personal interests. This
approach acknowledges that statements made consciously and
reasonably are perceived by the declarant to be in furtherance
of his interests, while simultaneously grounding the reliability in
the fact that the statements would be against the individual’s
interests if false.
Unlike the current structure of Rule
804(b)(3), this formulation is consistent with the thought
processes of rational actors.
This formulation would play out in two ways. First, the
exception would only apply to statements that have significance
128
to the declarant’s personal interests.
For example, a
mundane observation about the weather would be inadmissible
because if that statement were false, it would not be against the
individual’s interests.
Only considerations important to a
129
person are ranked sufficiently high to affect rational choice.
In other words, to achieve sufficient reliability to justify
admission, the statement must be of the sort that a reasonable
person would not make if it were untrue.
Some examples may be instructive.
A straightforward
illustration involves an individual’s monetary interests. If a
debtor (“D”) says he owes a creditor (“C”) money, that
statement would be admissible under this reformulation. The
statement is not reliable because it goes against D’s interests,
because if it truly went against D’s interests, he would not have
130
made the statement.
In addition, it is not necessarily against
D’s interests to admit to owing a debt. D may be influenced by a
bounded self-interest that causes him to consider the situation
131
of C.
Moreover, it may be in D’s interest to acknowledge the
debt because of the legal ramifications of lying or acting in bad
faith.
D’s statement is reliable, however, because if the

128

As I will discuss in the next section, these personal interests should not
extend to penal interests that serve to exculpate an accused defendant
because of the intensified reliability concerns discussed in Part II.B. See infra
P ART III.B.
129
See Rostain, supra note 75, at 977.
130
See supra P ART II.A.
131
See supra notes 81-82.
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statement were untrue, it clearly would have been against D’s
interests to make the declaration. No reasonable person would
have made such a statement if it were false, so it must be true.
Under the same fact pattern, if D told C that he has money,
that statement would fall under the rule because it would be
against D’s interests if the statement were false. If D were
penniless, it would be against his interests to tell a creditor that
he in fact had money. As such, D’s statement is reliable not
because an acknowledgement of possessing money is against D’s
interests, but because if the statement was untrue, the statement
would be against D’s interests.
No rational actor would
fabricate in this situation, so D’s statement carries sufficient
guarantees of reliability to warrant admission.
The second way this formulation would play out involves
the limited admissibility of the statements to the portions that
retain enhanced reliability. Under this restructured rule, the
declaration would be admitted only to the extent to which it
would go against an individual’s interests. In the example
mentioned above, if D stated that he owed C $500, that
statement would be probative only for the limited proposition
that D owed at least $500. If D lied to the extent that D actually
owed less than $500, it would have been against D’s interests to
make the statement. No reasonable actor would have made
such a false statement, so the statement must be true. D’s
statement would not be probative, however, for the proposition
that D does not owe more than $500. If D actually owed C
$1,000, D’s acknowledgement of owing $500 would be false and
still would be aligned with D’s personal interests. Therefore,
D’s statement retains no special reliability for the proposition
that he does not owe more than $500, and should not be
admitted for that purpose.
Along similar lines, if a property owner (“O”) stated his
property line extends to a certain point, the statement is
reliable for the proposition that O’s property does not extend
beyond that point. If O’s property actually extended beyond
that point, O’s statement would be against his interests.
Because no rational actor would make such a false statement,
the statement must be true. Again, however, this statement
would have limited admissibility. O’s statement would not be
probative for the proposition that O owns no less than that
designated amount, because the reliability guarantee collapses.
If O in fact owned less property, O’s original statement could be
both false and consistent with his personal interests.
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Needless to say, admitting evidence of a limited purpose is
commonplace in American courtrooms.
Judges frequently
present juries with evidence admissible only for a specific
purpose. For example, evidence of prior acts is not considered
character evidence if admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence
132
404(b).
To be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence
must serve some other purpose besides showing action in
conformity therewith, such as evidence of motive, common
133
plan, or intent.
The opposing party may request the judge to
provide the jury with a limiting instruction, informing the jury
134
of the proper scope of the evidence.
It is also common for courts to parse out-of-court
statements so that only those segments with reliable probative
force are admissible. For example, statements made for medical
diagnosis are only admissible to show the injuries suffered, and
135
how they were suffered, but not to prove liability.
The reason
is that the added reliability of a statement against medical
interests pertains only to the declarant’s interests in receiving
proper medical care. This added reliability of truthfulness does
not extend to how the injury was caused. The Court also
136
required similar parsing with Rule 804(b)(3) in Williamson.
The Court opined that the exception should not extend to
collateral, non-inculpatory statements because they lack
137
adequate indicia of reliability.
Therefore, under Williamson,
only those portions of a declaration that are inculpatory are
admissible.

132

FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (“Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.”).
133
Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 552-53 (6th Cir. 2001)
(holding the admission of a prior unindicted bank robbery proper for the
limited purpose of proving identity, and not for showing the defendant’s
propensity for criminal activity); United States v. Butch, 256 F.3d 171, 176-77
(3d Cir. 2001) (permitting the admission evidence of an accused drug
trafficking conspirator’s prior dealing with coconspirators to rebut
defendant’s claim that he acted without criminal intent).
134
F ED . R. E VID . 105 (“When evidence which is admissible as to one party
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another
purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its
proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”).
135
F ED . R. E VID . 803 advisory committee’s note (“[A] patient’s statement
that he was struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that
the car was driven through a red light.”).
136
Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598-602 (1994).
137
Id. at 605; see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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B. Eradicating Admission of Statements Against Penal Interests
The reliability of statements pertaining to penal interests is
simply too suspect to justify a hearsay exception. As discussed
earlier, explanations abound for why persons make self138
incriminating statements.
Depending on the circumstances,
these fabrications can unfairly exculpate or inculpate criminal
defendants, both of which are socially undesirable scenarios. In
criminal trials, where society has such compelling interests,
these flaws are unacceptable. The solution is simply to remove
any inclusion of penal interests and limit Rule 804(b)(3) to
statements against a declarant’s personal interests.
This modification would hardly be a ground-breaking
venture for evidentiary law. The exclusion of statements against
penal interests has strong roots in Anglo-American
jurisprudence. In fact, deletion of the clause pertaining to
penal interests would mark a return to the common law and the
American rule prior to adoption of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. The common law rule, presented in Sussex Peerage
139
and other English cases, refused to admit statements against
140
penal interests.
Prior to enactment of the Federal Rules, “the
overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions” adopted this
141
English rule.
In addition, the Supreme Court firmly rejected statements
against penal interests prior to the enactment of Rule
142
804(b)(3). In Donnelly v. United States, the Court reviewed a
murder conviction in which the trial judge excluded testimony
offered by the defendant that a deceased third party confessed
143
to the murder.
Justice Pitney’s opinion relied heavily on
Sussex Peerage and American case law in holding the evidence
144
inadmissible.
The Court reasoned “it is almost universally

138

See supra P ART II.B.
Another English case restricting the declaration against interests
exception was the Berkeley Peerage Case. See Donnelly v. United States, 228
U.S. 243, 273 (discussing the Berkeley Peerage Case).
140
Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (H.L. 1844).
141
James B. Haddad & Richard G. Agin, A Potential Revolution in Bruton
Doctrine: Is Bruton Applicable Where Domestic Evidence Rules Prohibit Use of
Codefendant’s Confession as Evidence Against a Defendant Although the
Confrontation Clause Would Allow Such Use?, 81 J. C RIM . L. & C RIMINOLOGY 235,
236 n.10 (1990).
142
228 U.S. 243 (1913).
143
Id. at 272.
144
Id. at 273.
139
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held that this must be an interest of a pecuniary character.”
Justice Pitney further noted the “great and practically
unanimous weight of authority in the state courts against
admitting evidence of confessions of third parties, made out of
146
court, and tending to exonerate the accused.”
Furthermore, although the Federal Rules include the penal
interests clause, there is far from unanimous agreement on this
approach. Even states that have adopted rules of evidence that
track the Federal Rules differ on the admissibility of statements
against penal interests. At least six of these “Federal Rules”
states, which include Arkansas, Florida, Maine, Nevada, North
Dakota, and Vermont, continue to exclude inculpatory
147
statements against penal interests.
CONCLUSION

We cannot help but laud the objective of Rule 804(b)(3).
In enacting the rule, Congress sought to advance our legal
system’s liberal thrust in admitting reliable evidence that assists
the fact-finder. Notwithstanding this liberal thrust, however,
any evidence presented to the fact-finder must be reliable. This
concern with reliability is most pressing for hearsay
declarations, which are inherently suspect. Therefore, the
exceptions to the general bar against admitting hearsay are
grounded in some enhanced reliability in the particular
declaration. Congress believed Rule 804(b)(3) secured this
enhanced reliability.
Congress was wrong. Statements against legal interests
retain no special reliability to warrant a hearsay exception. The
current structure of Rule 804(b)(3) is marred with
psychological inconsistencies and errors that make the admitted
hearsay far less reliable than it initially may seem. In fact,
under the very rational actor theory on which the current rules
rest, statements against legal interests provide no stronger
guarantee of trustworthiness than any other hearsay declaration.
As I argue in this Article, however, it is possible to
reformulate Rule 804(b)(3) in a manner that would achieve the
reliability guarantees that Congress desired.
Instead of
145

Id.
Id. at 273-74.
147
G REGORY P. J OSEPH & S TEPHEN A. S ALTZBURG , E VIDENCE
F EDERAL R ULES IN THE S TATES 16 (1987).
146
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considering the impossibility of whether a reasonable person is
behaving against his interests, the rule should consider whether
a statement, if untrue, would be against the person’s non-penal
interests.
Unlike the present rule, this reformulation is
consistent with the actions of reasonable persons.

